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GooDWINE V. SUPERIOR COURT
(63 C.2d 481; 47 Cal.Rptr. 201. 407 P.2d 11

[L.A. No. 28464.
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In Bank. Nov. 4, 1965.]

MARJORIE E. GOODWINE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPE.
RIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respond.
ent; DON F. GOODWINE, Real Party in Interest.
[1] Divorce-Separate Maintenance-.Turisdiction.-In an action
for separate maintenance, domicile is neither sufficient nor
necessary for jurisdiction. An action for separate maintenance
is essentially one for support, seeking a money judgment
against defendant, and jurisdiction does not depend on domi·
cile but on acquiring personal jurisdiction over the husband
or quasi·in.rem jurisdiction over his property.
[2] Id.-Separate Ma.intenance--Jurisdiction.-In a separate main·
tenance action, once quasi.in.rem jurisdiction is established
the court can award a money judgment to the extent of de·
fendant's interest in the property attached.
[3] Id.-8eparate Maintenance-.Turisdiction.-The residence requirements applicable to plaintiff in divorce actions are in·
applicable in actions for separate maintenance.
[4] Appearance-General Appearance-Motions.-Defendant's motion to dismiss a separate maintenance action against him on
the theory that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction was not a general appearance giving the court personal
jurisdiction over him, since the challenge to subject.matter
jurisdiction was not inconsistent with a challenge to personal
jurisdiction, and, moreover, since the court must dismiss on
the ground of lack of subject.matter jurisdiction on its own
motion, an appropriate challenge thereto aids the court in
performing its duty. (Overruling Judson v. Superior Court,
21 Ca1.2d 11 [129 P.2d 361].)
[5] Courts-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-In determining the
applicability of the doctrine of fOTUm notJ conveniens, a court
must consider the public interest as well as the private inter·
ests of the litigants, and such factors as the ease of access of
proof, the availability and cost of obtaining witnesses, the
possibility of h'arassment of defendant in litigating in an in·
convenient forum, the enforceability of the judgment, the
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 222; Am.Jur.,
Husband and Wife (1st ed § 401).
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appearance, §§ 21·24; Am.Jur.2d, Appear.
ance, § 21.
McX. Dig. References: [1.3] Divorce, § 154; [4] Appearance,
§ 11; [5.7] Courts, § 24.
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burden on the community in litigating matters not of local
concern, and the desirability of litigating local matters in
local courts.
[6] Id.-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-Unless the balance is
strongly in defendant's favor after considering the factors relating to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, plaintiff's chQice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
[7] Id.-Jurisdiction-Transitory Actions.-A determination that
a plaintiff commencing an action in California is domiciled
here ordinarily precludes granting defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to vacate an order dismissing a separate maintenance action and to compel such court to take
jurisdiction of the action. Roger Alton Pfaff, Judge. Peremptory writ granted.
Richard M. Moore and Cooper & Nelsen for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William F.
Stewart, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Newman & Newman and Nathan Newby, Jr., for Real Party
in Interest.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-On October 8, 1964, plaintiff, Marjorie
E. Goodwine, began an action for separate maintenance
against her husband, Don F. Goodwine. A writ of attachment was levied upon defendant's real property in the County
of Los Angeles, giving the trial court quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. (Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 415 [170 P.2d
670] ; Nichols v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 589, 599 [36 P.2d
380, 95 A.L.R. 894]; Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 275
[47 P. 37, 56 Am.St.Rep. 97, 37 L.R.A. 626].) Plaintiff secured an order for service by publication based on an affidavit
that defendant resided out of the state (see Code Civ. Pr~.,
§ 412), and defendant was personally served in Mexico (see
Code Civ. Proc., § 413). Defendant moved to quash the writ
of attachment, the service of summons and complaint, and to
dismiss the action, on the ground that the trial court was
without jurisdiction. The trial court granted defendant's
motion and dismissed the action, staying its order pending
appellate review. Plaintiff then filed this petition for a writ
of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order dismissing the action.
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Plaintiff and defendant were married in Reno, Nevada, on
April 1, 1955. They lived in California until March 1963,
when they moved to Mexico to live in retirement. Defendant
obtained a resident's visa and became a domiciliary of Mexico.
Plaintiff obtained a tourist visa because of local regulations,
but she also intended to become a permanent resident of
Mexico. On September 3, 1964, plaintiff left defendant and
went to Los Angeles to reside with her sister, allegedly because he treated plaintiff with extreme cruelty. Plaintiff then
brought the action for separate maintenance, seeking support
of $1,000 per month, attorney's fees, and costs out of defendant's property within the state.
Defendant contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction
in an action for separate maintenance when np,ither party is
domiciled in the state. There is no merit in this contention.
In an action for divorce, domicile is dispositive, since "the
domicile of one spouse within a State gives power to that
State . . . to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted."
(Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 229-230 [65
S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366].) The state in
which one spouse is domiciled is deemed to have sufficient
interest to terminate the marriage. Thus, a state has the
power to grant an ex parte divorce to a domiciliary wife without personal jurisdiction over the husband or quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction over his property. (Williams v. North Carolina I,
317 U.S. 287, 303 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R.
1273].) [1] In an action for separate maintenance, however, domicile is neither sufficient nor necessary for jurisdiction. An action for separate maintenance is essentially
an action for support (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954)
Jurisdiction, § llO, p. 375), seeking a money judgment against
the defendant. Jurisdiction does not depend on domicile but
on acquiring personal jurisdiction over the husband or quasiin-rem jurisdiction over his property. (Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 [77 S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456];
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406, 415 [170 P.2d 670] ; 1 Witkin, Cal. ProcedUFe (1954) Jurisdiction, § llO, pp. 375-376; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 537.) [2] Once quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is
established, the court can award a money judgment to the
extent of the defendant's interest in the property attached.
(Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra, 28 Cal.2d 406, 415.) [3] The
residence requirements applicable to the plaintiff in divorce
actions (Civ. Code, §128) are inapplicable in actions for separate maintenance. (Hiner v. Hiner, 153 Cal. 254, 260 [94

)
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P. 1044].) Exercising jurisdiction in these cases does not
encourage forum-shopping, since the court will not necessarily
apply the substantive law of the forum under the applicable
conflict of laws rules. (See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d
588,596 [12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].)
[4] Plaintiff contends that since defendant moved to dismiss the action, he made a general appearance giving the trial
court personal jurisdiction over him, rather than quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. We agree with plaintiff that defendant made a
motion to dismiss. Even though the request for dismissal is
found only in the title of defendant's motion, the motion rests
on a theory that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
when neither party was domiciled in the state. Defendant
thus challenged the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court,
as well as its personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree
with plaintiff, however, that a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-mattter jurisdiction is a general appearance.
" , [W] here the defendant appears and asks some relief which
can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of cause and person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court as completely as if he had been regularly
served with process, whether such an appearance by its terms
be limited to a special appearance or not.''' (Security Loan
&- Trust Co. v. Boston &- S. R. Fruit Co., 126 Cal. 418, 422
[58 P. 941, 59 P. 296J ; In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 392 [58 P.
22J; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Jurisdiction, § 72,
p. 342.) An answer, a demurrer, and a motion to strike constitute a general appearance (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014), since a
court does not decide questions raised by such pleadings at the
behest of persons over whom it has no jurisdiction. A court
need not have jurisdiction over the person, however, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the court
must dismiss on that ground on its own motion. (Morris v.
Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326-327 [9 S.Ct. 289, 32 L.Ed. 690];
Abelleira v. D1'stn~ct Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 302-303
[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) Thus, a challenge to the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court is not inconsistent
with a challenge to personal jurisdiction. Moreover, since the
court must dismi~s on its own motion, an appropriate challenge
to subject-matter jurisdiction aids the court in performing
its duty. The defendant should therefore be allowed to point
out lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without making a general appearance. Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Ca1.2d 11 [129
P.2d 361], is to the contrary, but it has often been criticized
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(see 31Ca1.L.Rev. 342; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954),
§ 76, p. 346) and is overruled.
Defendant contends that even if the trial court has quasiin-rem jurisdiction, it properly refused to exercise it under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court, however, has not yet considered whether the doctrine of forum
non conveniens applies to this case, since it treated defendant's
motion as being "for the sole purpose of objecting to the
court's jurisdiction." Since the court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter, it can now consider the applicability of
that doctrine, which is accepted in this jurisdiction (Price
v. Atchison, T. ~ S.D. Ry. Co., 42 Ca1.2d 577, 583 [268 P.2d
457, 43 A.L.R.2d 756]) and applies to actions for support
(Wilburn v. Wilburn, (D.C.) 192 A.2d 797, 800; Melvin
v. Melvin, 129 F.2d 39, 40 [76 App.D.C. 56]). [5] In determining the applicability of the doctrine, the court must consider the public interest as well as the private interests of the
litigants. The court must consider such factors as the ease
of access of proof, the availability and cost of obtaining witnesses, the possibility of harassment of the defendant in litigating in an inconvenient forum, the enforceability of the judgment, the burden on the community in litigating matters not
of local concern, and the desirability of litigating local matters in local courts. [6] '" [U] nless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.''' (Price v. Atchison,T. &- S.F.
Ry. Co., supra, 42 Ca1.2d 577, 585.) The trial court must
in the first instance consider these factors in determining
whether to apply the doctrine. Thus plaintiff alleges mistreatmt'nt throughout the marriage, both in California and
in Mexico, and the trial court must ascertain the location of
witnt'sses and other sources of proof. Moreover. the trial court
must consider plaintiff's contention that she is domiciled in
California. The trial court originally relied on defendant's
affidavit that plaintiff was domiciled in Mexico, on the failure
of plaintiff to file a counteraffidavit, on the ambiguity of
plaintiff's allegation of residence in her complaint, and on
points and authorities submitted by the partit's in deciding
plaintiff was not a California domiciliary. On remand, plaintiff can submit further evidence of her domicile in this state.
[7] A determination that a plaintiff is domiciled here would
ordinarily preclude granting the defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. (See Barrett,

486

IN RE STERLING

(63 C.M

. ns 35 Cal.L.Rev. 380,
· e of Forum Non C onveme ,
The D oc t rm
413-415.)
. .
prayed
Let the peremptory wrIt ISsue as
.
Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J.,
McComb, J., Peters, J.,
and Burke, J., concurred.
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